Freedom of Religion or Belief and traditional Islam

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Introduction – Religious minorities are in peril

On a rainy October evening in 2012, more than 700 demonstrators, in an act of peaceful solidarity with persecuted Christians in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere in the world, marched down the main street in Oslo. Stopping in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs they delivered an appeal to Norwegian authorities to continue their focus on strengthening Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) and to take tangible steps to help Christians and other vulnerable minorities.

In response Norwegian political leaders expressed grave concern for the situation for persecuted and mistreated Christians as well as other religious minorities. These leaders emphasized the need for tolerance and the importance of better understanding of and protection of FoRB. In his speech, Dagfinn Høybråten, representing the Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs committee said, "We are here to draw attention to a basic human right, namely freedom of belief. It applies to everyone – regardless of faith! In our own country, we take freedom of belief for granted." (Kraglund) (translation authors). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide, in his address noted that Freedom of Religion or Belief "… is a field where Foreign Service skills can be strengthened. The work is in progress and I'm going to give it high priority."[1]

It is not only in the Foreign Service that knowledge and

skills related (FoRB) need strengthening. Having taught on this issue to numerous groups both in Norway and abroad, I have registered both a great interest and as well as a need for increased understanding of FoRB everywhere. One particular interest I have encountered is in understanding the difficulties related to FoRB for religious minorities in Muslim dominated countries.

In this article, I will look closer at FoRB, describing and discussing its core elements and its historical development. With this as the backdrop, I will address the question of why FoRB seems to be little respected and protected in countries where Islam is the dominant religion. To help shed light on this question, I will draw primarily on the ideas of the of leading Islamic scholar and reformist, Mohsen Kadivar.

What is religious freedom?

The idea of human rights builds on the premise that all human beings are free, have inherent dignity and worth and should be treated with justice and equality. This is essential for promoting peaceful coexistence between individuals and societies. An integral and important part of the modern human rights regime is the concept of religious freedom. As the world becomes increasingly more interconnected, and meetings of different religions and worldviews become more commonplace, the principles of religious freedom are challenged, and they challenge. According to article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) – "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance".[2]

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is often referred to as the right to Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB). FoRB is intended to be broadly understood which means that it encompasses theistic, non-theistic and atheistic worldviews. Some consider this fundamental freedom to be one of the first and foremost of human rights. On 6 January 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his annual speech to the Ame-

rican congress where he envisioned a world of peaceful coexistence between nations in which four essential freedoms were upheld; freedom of speech, *freedom of worship* (my emphasis), freedom from want and freedom from fear.[3] Seven years later the authors of the UDHR included Roosevelt's words in the preamble of this momentous document. They explain that these four freedoms are what all people ultimately strive after. In a similar vein, P.C. Chang, one of the members of the human rights committee tasked with authoring the UDHR said, "the right to freedom of thought and religion was one of 'the most important principles in the declaration' because 'from the eighteenth century, when the idea of human rights was born in Western Europe, freedom of thought had figured among the essential human freedoms'".[4] Likewise, according to Manfred Nowak and Tanja Vospernik, "There is no doubt that freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief is one of the most important human rights, enjoying as it does the privileged status of a nonderogable right".[5]

Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has stated on numerous occasions "that, as enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention".[6]

However, what is this most important human right? Where did it come from? What does it mean? What implications does it have? In this section I will 1) describe the historical background of FoRB, and 2) discuss the normative core of this right.

FoRB – A historical backdrop

"Freedom of religion is one of the oldest and most controversial of all human rights and has been the object of international concern from the very beginnings of the modern international state system".[7] It could be argued that the concept of FoRB was developed most explicitly in Europe during the Reformation period and its aftermath with its incessant religious wars. Throughout the Middle Ages and up until after the Enlightenment period, persecution was widespread and egregious of people who held a belief other than the dominant religion of the region. The moral justification for this was often based on

an interpretation of the Christian Bible stemming from the church father Augustine. He interpreted texts such as the parable of the tares (Matt. 13:24-30), and the parable of the great feast (Luke 14:21-23) in a way that opened up for the use of force to help heretics see the error of their ways. This way of viewing dissident religious views developed into the inquisition and witch hunts. According to Professor of History Emiritus, Perez Zagorin, "Of all the great world religions past and present, Christianity has been by far the most intolerant".[8]

Nevertheless, despite (although some would say because of – see Zagorin) a culture of disrespect for people of other faiths and a lack of protections for religious minorities the modern idea of respect for Human Rights and FoRB took root. In the wake of the Reformation major changes occurred. The Holy Roman Empire was crumbling; both politically and religiously. Reformers like Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melchanthon and others fought for their own right to have a dissenting view, but they violently opposed others who wanted the same right. Neither religious conversion nor religious plurality was acceptable to these churchmen. While they helped to shape the dogma for newly splintered religious groups, others were fighting for the right for all to be free from persecution solely for their dissenting views. Among these were Sebastian Castello (1515-1563), Roger Williams (1603-1683), John Locke (1632-1704) and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) to name a few. At least partially through their tireless and often unrewarded (at times they too suffered persecution) efforts the idea of religious freedom gained ground and has become the dominating way of approaching religious plurality.

Gradually the rights of individuals and not just rulers or groups became more prevalent. Evans and Lindholm (Lindholm et al.) identify three overlapping stages (or models) of development in the relationship between the state and the protection of religious freedom in Europe.

The first model, *cuius region, euis religio* means literally "whose territory, his religion". In other words, the ruler of a territory determined the faith of the inhabitants of the territory assuming that religion would act as glue in society. It also provided a way for secular leaders to get out from under the yoke

of troublesome religious leaders. During this stage, concessions were often granted to smaller enclaves of dissenting religious adherents, but these concessions could be and often were revoked entailing a sharp reduction in the already limited rights these minority groups had. Focus was on freedom for the ruler of the territory and not for its inhabitants. Religious plurality was looked at as a threat to the order of society and therefore needed to be limited. Conversion was looked at as treason and not accepted. It was expected that the ruler would be partial to his co-religionists and discriminate against other religious adherents. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555[9] is often looked at as the start of this model, although the term was not coined until later. This was the dominating model until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 ended the wars of religion (albeit not fully) and established the concept of the sovereign state. While this in and of itself did not immediately lead to the abolishment of this model, it did open the door for other solutions and led to the next model.

The second model is called the *minority protection* model and began to become more prominent with the rise of the nation-state. As the concept of sovereign states grew, the idea began to germinate that citizens from state A, all or most of whom were adherents of the same religion, living in state B, where another religious tradition was dominant, needed to be protected. This led to bilateral and multilateral agreements between sovereigns whereby they each agreed to offer some form of toleration and protection to enclaves of religious adherents/citizens from the other sovereignty within the geographical confines of the their domain. Religious pluralism was tolerated, but religious minorities were looked at with suspicion. Religious conversion could be considered treasonous and the state was expected to be partial to and give benefits to the majority religion.

The third model is the *human rights* model which has been the dominant model since shortly after the Second World War and the production of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here the starting point is a neutral or impartial state with regard to religion or belief and the assumption that there is a religiously plural society. Pluralism is not looked at as

something negative. Religious conversion is not a threat to the social order. There is a focus on the rights of the individual and on religious communities, not on the state. These rights are extended to all individuals everywhere and the nationality of the individual should not play any role. Within this model the modern notion of FoRB has blossomed.

Normative core – What is FoRB
The most basic and concise formulation of what FoRB entails can be found in article 18 of the UDHR, which states *Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief.* In short the essence of FoRB can be divided into three main components. Everyone has the right to: 1) *have* a religion or belief, 2) *change* his/her religion or belief and 3) *practice/manifest* his/her religion or belief. While these three elements account for the essentials of FoRB, they do not adequately help those not familiar with FoRB to easily see the intricacies involved with this basic Human Right and fundamental freedom. In order to get a bigger picture of what FoRB entails we will now look at the generally accepted eight normative core elements to FoRB:[10]

Internal Freedom – This corresponds to what I have above termed the right to have a religion or belief and also encompasses the right to change one's religion or belief. This component has to do with the innermost being of a person and may not be legitimately limited under any circumstances (see component 8 below).
    External freedom – This allows for the manifestation or practice of religion in private or public, alone or corporately. It is here that most abuses of FoRB occur.
    Noncoercion – No one should be forced to change his or her belief nor should he or she be forced to maintain a religion or belief he or she wants to leave.
    Nondiscrimination – All people should be treated equally, regardless of religious belief. Majority religions should have no advantage over non-majority religions. This is emphasized in common article 2 of the UDHR, International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other international mecha-nisms.

Rights of parents and guardians – It is the rights of parents or, as the case may be, guardians to raise their children in the belief of their choice. This is, of course to be done with respect to the evolving capacities of the child (see art. 14 of the Con-vention on the Rights of the Child for more on this).

Corporate freedom and legal status – Religious groups have the right to organize themselves and be recognized as legal entities. This also includes the right to handle their own affairs such as determining doctrine, appointing clergy, establishing institutions, etc. See also art. 22 of the ICCPR for more on the right to association with others

Limits of permissible restrictions on external freedoms – Any restrictions are to be interpreted narrowly and concern only the external freedoms, not the internal freedoms; the right to have or change one's religion or belief. In order for a state to limit a religious practice three criteria must be met:
- The limitation must be prescribed by law.
- The limitation must have a legitimate aim – It must protect at least one of the following:
    •   Public safety
    •   Public order
    •   Public health
    •   Public morals
    •   Other fundamental rights or freedoms of others.
- The limitation must be necessary and proportionate. If the aim can be realized in any other way than to limit the reli-gious practice it must be done so.

Nonderogability – Article 4 of the ICCPR stipulates that the rights and freedoms in the covenant can be derogated in times of war or state emergency. There are a few exceptions to this rule. Article 18 is one of these exceptions; article 4 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR states " No derogations of articles 6, 7, 8 (para-graphs 1 and 2), 11, 15 16 and 18 may be made under this pro-vision."

Two assumptions underlying FoRB

It is important here to emphasize that there are two assumptions that underlie FoRB; 1) religious pluralism and 2) state neutrality/impartiality. Firstly, FoRB assumes the existence of religious pluralism. Where pluralism exists there will be a need for toleration as a tool for helping to build peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups of differing beliefs. Respect for FoRB can help provide this. As Morsink puts it, article 18 of the UDHR is "governed by the underlying idea that a plurality of religious and secular ideologies should be able to live peacefully under the security umbrella of a single state" (Morsink: 259). It is assumed that a pluralistic society can exist with equal treatment of all members of society.

Secondly, religious pluralism exists within a state and this state should be neutral/impartial with respect to religion and life stance. No religions or life stances are to be accorded any special benefits, even if they are the majority religion. Members of a majority religion do not have any rights that members of any other group do not have.

Freedom to change religion

I would like to revisit one aspect of the internal freedom of FoRB that is especially relevant with regard to our later discussion of Islam; the right to change one's religion.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of FoRB is the right to change one's religion or belief. While this important aspect of FoRB is mostly an internal freedom (core element 1 above), many people associate changing of religion with some sort of ritual and would thus think of it in terms of an external freedom (core element 2 above). Ghanea, for instance, addresses this when she writes, "Apostasy, therefore, cannot solely be located either within the right to "have" freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, or within the freedom to "manifest" religion or belief".[11]

In the drafting of article 18 of the UDHR the concept of the right to change one's belief was hotly debated. Especially Islamic countries reacted to the 'unnecessary' phrase "to change his religion". Jamil Boroody, the delegate from Saudi Arabia stated that he felt that the text placed too much emphasis on this

aspect of the right and should be struck from the text. In his thinking "This was the kind of thinking which he said had led to the crusades and religious wars".[12] Several Latin American countries supported this line of thinking. Others were as vehement about ensuring that the right to change clause must be included. An Indian delegate, Mohammed Habib, stated that accepting the Saudi Arabia amendment would be "a tragedy".[13] In the end the right to change one's belief was accepted and when the time came to vote on the entire UDHR, including article 18, no countries voted against it (although eight did abstain; Saudi Arabia being the only Islamic country among them).

Still, since the creation of the UDHR several other international documents have addressed the question of religious freedom and to some extent expanded on the meaning of this right, but also narrowed its scope especially with respect to the right to change religion or belief. Two of these documents are the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief of 1981(also known as the 1981 Declaration). It is important to note here that while a declaration is not legally binding a convention is. Hence the 1981 declaration does not carry the same weight as the ICCPR. A special case can be made for the UDHR which is indisputably the document that lays the foundation for all modern international Human Rights law. It is also generally accepted that many of its articles, whereof article 18 is one, carry the weight of customary international law. Still, it is interesting to note that while article 18 of the ICCPR adds three paragraphs that art. 18 of the UDHR doesn't have, thus expanding and deepening the understanding of this right, the first paragraph is almost identical to the UDHR except where it comes to the word "change". Here is a comparison of the two texts.

Art. 18 UDHR - *Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to* change *his religion or belief*… (emphasis authors)

Art. 18 ICCPR - *Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include*

> *freedom to* have or to adopt *a religion or belief of his choi-ce…* (emphasis authors)

In the ICCPR the wording has been changed in a direction that might indicate that there is a watering down of this aspect of FoRB.

Even more drastic is the change in the 1981 Declaration which states –

> *Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, consci-ence and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice…*

No mention is made at all of the right for an individual to leave his or her current belief and adhere to another. It is noteworthy for our present discussion that this omission occurred because of "…the insistence of delegates from Islamic states."[13]

Thankfully, at least regarding this point, the declaration does not have the legally binding status that the ICCPR has. And it is also reassuring to know that the wording of the ICCPR is not as ambiguous as it first appears. The committee responsible for monitoring and interpreting the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee, has in General Comment 22 explained that the phrase, to have or adopt, makes no sense unless it means to leave one religion or belief and enter into another. "The Committee observes that the freedom to "have or to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief."[14]

With these three issues in mind; *religious pluralism, state neutrality/impartiality* and the right to change religion or belief, let us turn our attention to the challenges they pose for Islam.

Mohsen Kadivar[15] – Traditional Islam and intellectual Islam

Some in the Western world may be quick to blame Islam for abuses of FoRB and other Human Rights in Muslim dominated countries. Drawing on the work of Islamic scholar and refor-

mist, Mohsen Kadivar I posit that it is traditional Islam that is at odds with the modern concept of Human Rights and not Islam per se. I will now turn to an examination of Kadivar's notion of traditional Islam and his solution to the compatibility problem between traditional Islam and Human Rights, especially Freedom of Religion or Belief.

Kadivar contends that there is a difference between what he terms traditional (or sometimes historical) Islam and intellectual Islam or Islamic modernism. According to Kadivar, traditional Islam maintains that traditional Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) is immutable and therefore relevant in its entirety for humankind's modern challenges (Kadivar in Vogt et al: 56-58). In addition, says Kadivar "…traditional Islam most important underlying principle, in terms of epistemology and theories about religion and human beings, is the limited scope of human reason or the human mind."[16] In other words, Traditional Islam can be roughly defined as a form of Islam that denies or largely downplays the role of human reason in providing adequate solutions for most of humankind's problems.

Downplaying human reason is a challenge to Human Rights thinking which has human reason as its basis. Kadivar suggests that there are six main points of contention between traditional Islam and human rights: 1) inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims, 2) inequality between men and women, 3) inequality between slaves and free, 4) inequality between Islamic jurists and lay Muslims in the matter of public affairs, 5) freedom of religion or belief versus punishment for apostasy and 6) extra-judicial punishments, violent punishments and torture. Two of these are especially relevant for our discussion: inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims (point 1 above) and freedom of religion or belief versus punishment for apostasy (changing one's religion) (point 5 above).[17]

Inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims is an issue for many Muslim dominated societies today that do not accept religious plurality and the state as a neutral/impartial part. Historically, non-Muslims living in Muslim ruled areas have been faced with a number of different practices. Nevertheless, the main approach to non-Muslims was to put them into one of two categories: non-believers and *dhimmi*, (protected people). Non-

believers had little or no rights. Dhimmi were accorded some rights but not equal rights to Muslims. While those in the second category were provided a margin of protection, it clearly did not see adherents of non-Muslim religions as equal to Muslims, deserving equal treatment. The term dhimmi is not officially used by Islamic states today, but many of the practices associated with dhimmitude are still in place. In Iran the Baha'i faith is not recognized as an accepted religion and its members are looked at as apostates. According to Iranian law, Baha'i blood is *mobah*, which means members of the Baha'i faith can be killed with impunity.[18] Although there is no civil law forbidding conversion, in 2009 there was a bill brought before the Iranian parliament that proposed that apostasy must be punished by death. The Iranian state is definitely not neutral nor impartial with respect to all religious traditions. All other religious groups are in various ways discriminated against and/or persecuted. This poses a considerable challenge to FoRB.

Apostasy has always been and continues to be a major challenge for Muslim dominated societies. The Malaysian women's rights activist, Zainah Anwar identifies "… three juristic positions on apostasy. The first position is that all unrepentant apostates deserve the death penalty… The second view prescribes the death penalty only if apostasy is accompanied by rebellion against the community and its legitimate leadership. The third view holds that even though apostasy is a grave sin, it is not a capital offence in Islam. Therefore, a personal change of faith merits no punishment."[19] While Anwar describes three possible ways of dealing with a Muslim who changes religion, An-Na'im remarks, "Nevertheless, the majority of jurists have classified apostasy as *hadd* punishable by death…"[20] In recent years, there have been a number of court cases involving Muslims who have converted to another religion. In spite of a conversion certificate from the Coptic Church Egypt refuses to allow Maher Al-Gohary's religious identity to be changed in his ID card. Since filing to change his ID card he has been the target of harassment, violence and has received threats on his life and has had to constantly move so as not to be identified as an apostate and killed.[21]

These examples illustrate the problem of lack of protection for religious minorities and those who want to change their religion from Islam. They are examples of the practice of traditional Islam. We now turn to how traditional Muslim jurists justify these practices.Traditional Muslim jurists have taken an *a priori* approach and suggested the idea that all that is needed for the running of society and human affairs is to identify and respect Shari`a precepts and that within Shari'a precepts one will find "true human rights". "True human rights are a part of the intrinsic interests that have been fully taken into account by All-Knowing God in the formulation of Shari'a precepts".[22] Unfortunately, these "true human rights" do not always match nor encompass human rights as understood by most who work in the field. And this is where the difficulty lies. Kadivar continues by addressing what he considers to be the most important underlying principle of traditional Islam which conflicts with the underlying principle of human rights. According to Kadivar, traditional Islam espouses a view that human reason or the human mind is inadequate for and incapable of determining what is ultimately most important for human happiness (Kadivar uses the term felicity). This principle has three sub-principles that can be drawn from it: 1) human reason is seriously limited in its capacity to grasp what does and does not constitute justice, 2) the human mind is not qualified to make laws and 3) Shari'a precepts are superior to human laws.

Intellectual Islam, on the other hand, is based on the premise that human reason is trustworthy and the human mind well enough qualified to be able to guide human beings in their social, economic and political spheres. As human rights is a product of human reason it, too, is adequate to act as a guiding principle for how humans should treat one another. Traditional Islam is not equipped to meet the challenges faced by the modern world. Traditional Islam, Kadivar believes, was more than adequate to meet the challenges in the pre-modern world; but it is not adequate today. According to Kadivar, Islam's teachings can be roughly divided into two groups: 1) matters related human beings' relationship to God (he has three separate categories for this) and 2) human beings' relationship to each other; a vertical and a horizontal "axis" if you will. Thus, 98% of

what is written in the Qur`ran relates to the first category, the vertical, with only 2% related to the second category; the horizontal. The situation is nearly the same when it comes to the Hadith, the percentages being 90% and 10% respectively. It is in relationship to the second category that traditional Islam and Intellectual Islam differ. Intellectual Islam takes the stance that since there is so little explicitly written about how to manage social interaction, it is reasonable that human reason is the best tool available for determining what justice is or is not and is likewise capable of creating laws that are both just and that promote human happiness. In order to do this, Intellectual Islam proposes a new form of abrogation.

While traditional Islam abrogates based on the formula where newer texts abrogate older ones. Intellectual Islam puts forward the idea that human reason can also be used to abrogate. This "effectively means that a narration-based Shari'a precept can be abrogated by a reason-based precept".[23]

Kadivar concludes that although traditional Islam is not compatible with Human Rights, Muslims should not despair. The choice is not between Human Rights and Islam. Traditional Islam is not Islam per se, rather it is only "… a particular conception of the religion of God."[24] A Muslim may legitimately reject traditional Islam, adhere to and respect Human Rights, while at the same time remaining loyal to Islam. In order to do this Kadivar proposes Intellectual Islam as an alternative to traditional Islam.

Concluding remarks
FoRB is arguably one of the oldest and most important human rights and fundamental freedoms. We have seen that with regard to traditional Islam there are a number of issues that are problematic. Traditional Islam does not recognize the right for Muslims to convert to another religion (or become atheists) nor does it adhere to the principles of state neutrality or religious plurality. Respecting these three values can contribute greatly to strengthening the equal treatment of all inhabitants of a country. It may also play a role in promoting peaceful coexistence between adherents of all religious and life stances. These tensions will, undoubtedly, continue in the foreseeable future.

In many ways the situation in many Muslim dominated countries today resembles the situation in Europe when the cuius regio, euis religio model was in vogue. Nevertheless, it can be hoped that Islamic reformers can help provide Muslims, leaders and followers alike, with the necessary tools to interpret Islam in a way that is more amenable to a Human Rights approach. And, which in turn can help create room for more peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups of all religious and non-religious persuasions. It would certainly be a step in the right direction if more Muslims held views similar to Kadivar's intellectual Islam.

Noter

[1] Accessed 20 Oct. 2012 http://translate.google.no/?hl=en&tab=wT#no/en/utenrikstjeneste , translation authors.
[2] Accessed 20 Oct. 2012 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18
[3] Accessed 17 Oct. 2012 www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/fourfreedoms
[4] Morsink: 281
[5] Lindholm et al: 147.
[6] Accessed at - http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/15778 on 20 Oct. 2012.
[7] Evans in Lindholm et al.:1.
[8] Zagorin:1.
[9] See Evans in Lindholm et al:4, Zagorin:10 and Kaplan:104.
[10] Lindholm et al pp xxxvii – xxxix.
[11] Ghanea in Lindholm et al.:671.
[12] Morsink: 25.
[13] Morsink: 25.
[14] Ghanea in Lindholm et al.: 677.
[15] Accessed at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Opendocument on 20 Oct. 2012).
[16] Mohsen Kadivar has a PhD degree in Islamic Philosophy and Theology from Tarbiat-e Modarres University in Tehran as well as the degree of Ijtihad from the Grand Ayatollah H.A. Montazeri in Qom Seminary, Iran. He is a leading dissident and intellectual of the Islamic reform movement in Iran. Since 2008 Dr. Kadivar has been in exile from Iran and is currently a visiting professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, USA. His areas of study include Islam and Human Rights and the tension between tradition and modernity in Islam.
[17] Kadivar in Vogt et al: 51.
[18] Kadivar in Vogt et al.:47.
[19] Accessed on 20 Oct 2012 http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012%282%29.pdf

[20]   Anwar in Vogt et al.: 184.
[21]   An-Na'im:109.
[22]   Accessed on 20 Oct. 2012 http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/egypt/20750/.
[23]   Kadivar in Vogt et al, 2009:49.
[24]   Kadivar in Vogt et al, 2009: 69.
[25]   Kadivar in Vogt et al: 53.

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